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UNTANGLING THE MARKET AND THE STATE 
Wentong Zheng* 
ABSTRACT 
The government plays increasingly active and diversified roles in the 
modern economy. How to draw the boundary between the market and the state 
has emerged as a contentious issue in various areas of law, including 
constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade. This Article surveys and 
critiques the law’s current approaches to the market-versus-state divide, 
embodied in four tests based on ownership, control, function, and role, 
respectively. This Article proposes an alternative market-versus-state test 
based on the nature of the power being exercised in the challenged action. This 
power-based test not only better distinguishes between the market and the 
state, but also illuminates why the market-versus-state distinction needs to be 
made in the first place. Applying this power-based test would bring much 
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INTRODUCTION 
The government is on the march. Having grown out of the pre- progressive 
mode of governance where all commercial disputes were resolved through 
private litigation, the tentacles of the government are reaching far and wide, 
extending regulatory oversight over a plethora of social and economic 
activities, including competition, railroad pricing, food and drug safety, and 
many others.1 Supported by a rapidly growing number of regulatory agencies, 
the government has assumed greater control over the economy, expanding its 
role from correcting market failures to administering social and economic 
justice.2  
Aside from its traditional role as a market regulator, the government is also 
emerging as a major participant in market activities. Among other things, 
governments own corporations,3 employ workers,4 and buy large amounts of 
goods and services.5 The footprint of the government has grown larger 
particularly because of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, which sparked 
unprecedented state intervention in the marketplace.6  
The rise of the government is even more dramatic if one’s horizon is 
broadened to include emerging economies on the world stage. Powerful state-
owned enterprises from countries like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are 
 
 1 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
401, 401 (2003).  
 2 See Karen Yeung, The Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 72–73 (Robert 
Baldwin et al. eds., 2010). 
 3 State-owned corporations are common even in Western countries. For a history of state-owned 
enterprises in Western countries, see Pier Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The 
Framework, in THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Pier Angelo 
Toninelli ed., 2000). 
 4 In the United States, the federal government is the largest employer in the nation, with more than 2.1 
million civilian workers and 1.3 million active duty military who serve in all fifty states and around the world. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 75 
(2015). 
 5 For example, “[t]he U.S. [federal] government is the largest single purchaser of goods and services in 
the world, awarding approximately $500 billion in contracts every year.” SBA’s Role in Government 
Contracting, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/contracting/what-government-contracting/sbas-
role-government-contracting (last visited Aug. 28, 2017). 
 6 In the wake of the global financial crisis, the U.S. government seized control of American 
International Group, one of the world’s largest insurers, to prevent the company from falling into bankruptcy. 
See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as 
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB122156561931242905?mg=prod/accounts-wsj. The U.S. government also took 60% ownership of General 
Motors as part of the latter’s government-orchestrated bankruptcy process. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, 
GM Collapses Into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB124385428627671889.  
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ushering in a new form of doing business, generally dubbed as “state 
capitalism.”7 As one indication of the ascendancy of state capitalism, the 
thirteen biggest oil firms in the world, which control more than three-quarters 
of the world’s oil reserves, are all state-backed.8 The government has been so 
successful in the new era of capitalism that one influential commentator has 
pronounced “the end of the free market.”9 
The changing dynamics between the government and the market have far-
reaching implications not just for the economy, but for the law as well. Courts 
and dispute settlement tribunals around the world are grappling with the 
increasingly active and diversified roles of the government. Since 2007, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on whether the government could require waste 
hauling firms to bring waste to publicly owned waste transfer and processing 
facilities,10 whether a state-owned hospital should be required to answer 
antitrust complaints when it attempted to acquire the only competing hospital 
in the region,11 and whether a state dental licensing board should be accorded 
immunity from antitrust law when it prohibited nondental practitioners from 
providing teeth-whitening services.12 In the meantime, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) opined on whether Chinese state-owned enterprises 
should be treated as public bodies akin to government agencies13 and whether a 
Canadian provincial government provided a subsidy to renewable energy 
producers when it purchased electricity from them at above-market rates.14 
 
 7 See The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21542931.  
 8 Id.  
 9 IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND 
CORPORATIONS? (2010). 
 10 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding 
that county ordinances mandating the delivery of waste to designated waste transfer and processing facilities 
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution).  
 11 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013) (holding that a state 
hospital authority is not entitled to state-action immunity in its acquisition of existing hospitals).  
 12 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (holding that a 
dental licensing board is not eligible for state-action immunity because its action was not actively supervised 
by the state).  
 13 Panel Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, ¶ 7.75, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS437/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 Panel Report] (holding that the United 
States acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations when it found that Chinese SOEs were public bodies 
based only on the grounds that they were majority owned or controlled by the Chinese government). 
 14 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector/Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, 
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013) [hereinafter DS412/DS426 AB Report] (holding that it was unable to 
determine whether Ontario’s feed-in-tariff program conferred a benefit because the relevant market for the 
benefit analysis should be the separate competitive markets for wind- and solar-generated electricity).  
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This Article is an attempt to systematically examine how the government 
interacts with the market and how the law treats such interactions. For ease of 
reference, this Article labels the various issues arising from the government-
market interactions as “market-versus-state”15 issues. While the market-versus-
state dynamics have shifted in leaps and bounds, legal scholarship has not kept 
up with the changes. Scholarly discussions of the market-versus-state divide 
date mostly back to several decades ago, when the state was still playing a 
static, confined role in the economy.16 And the existing academic literature 
approaches market-versus-state issues in isolated manners, paying essentially 
no attention to the systemic implications of the different ways of handling 
market-versus-state issues in different areas of law.17 
This Article sets out to narrow the gap in understanding how the law 
should deal with market-versus-state interactions. It starts with a survey of how 
market-versus-state interactions are being treated in three distinct areas of law: 
constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade.18 This Article discusses 
how the law in those areas employs four tests, based on ownership, control, 
function, and role, respectively, to draw the boundary between the market and 
the state. These tests, however, suffer serious limitations. They either presume 
that all conduct by the government is governmental in nature, or base legal 
outcomes on factors that do not lend themselves to objective determinations. 
 
 15 Unless otherwise noted, the term “state” in this Article refers to the government in the abstract sense, 
not any particular political division or subdivision.  
 16 See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) (discussing the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause in U.S. constitutional law); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
667 (1991) (proposing a process view of the antitrust state action doctrine); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States 
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 
(1996) (proposing an antidistortion standard for determining whether a state tax incentive violates the 
Commerce Clause); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988) 
(discussing principles for differentiating between permissible and impermissible state preferences for its own 
citizens); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development 
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996) (discussing the tax-subsidy distinction in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential 
Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227 (1987) (discussing the state action doctrine in antitrust law and 
its relationship to economic federalism); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (discussing the governmental-proprietary 
distinction in various constitutional law contexts). 
 17 Constitutional law scholars, for example, have not drawn connections between various market-
versus-state issues in constitutional law with their counterparts in other areas of law. See, e.g., Hellerstein & 
Coenen, supra note 16 (discussing the tax-subsidy distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence but not 
whether and how such a distinction is made in international trade law).  
 18 See infra Part I. 
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Alternatively, they are implicitly predicated on a value judgment that needs 
support on a case-by-case basis.19 
This Article contends that a more reliable way of distinguishing between 
the market and the state is to look at the nature of the power being exercised in 
the challenged action. If the power is a coercive one, backed up by state-
sanctioned violence with no recognized basis in property rights, then the state 
is exercising governmental power and is acting in a governmental capacity. 
But if the state exercises coercive power by virtue of its control of economic 
resources, then it is exercising market power that could have been exercised by 
private actors, and therefore is acting in a proprietary or market capacity. 20 
This power-based test, coupled with an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose 
of the legal regime at issue, not only better distinguishes between the market 
and the state, but also illuminates why the market-versus-state distinction 
needs to be made in the first place.21 This Article argues that applying this 
power-based test would bring much needed logic and clarity to many market-
versus-state issues in constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade.22 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the major 
market-versus-state issues that have come up in the law. Part II discusses the 
law’s current approaches to the market-versus-state divide, embodied in four 
tests based on ownership, control, function, and role, respectively. Part III 
proposes an alternative market-versus-state test based on power and an 
analytical framework within which the power-based test will be situated. Part 
IV discusses the application of the power-based test in various legal contexts.  
I. THE MARKET VERSUS THE STATE: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The interaction between the market and the state figures prominently in 
many areas of law, including constitutional law, antitrust, and international 
trade. In those areas of law, the legal consequences of an action by the state 
often depend on whether the state acts in a governmental or proprietary 
capacity, whether the individual or entity carrying out the disputed action is 
considered to be acting in a public or private capacity, and whether state 
participation in the market is considered to distort the market. In this Part, this 
Article surveys the legal treatment of these market-versus-state interactions. 
This survey revolves around three major legal issues that play prominent roles 
 
 19 See infra Part II. 
 20 See infra Section III.A. 
 21 See infra Section III.B. 
 22 See infra Part IV. 
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in constitutional law, antitrust law, and international trade law: the 
governmental-proprietary distinction, the public-private distinction, and market 
distortion by the state. The following discussions illustrate how important the 
market-versus-state distinction has become and, in some cases, how detached 
the distinction has grown from the actual purpose of the law.  
A. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction 
The governmental-proprietary distinction is a “cluster of rules” used by 
courts to distinguish the state’s core governmental functions from its 
proprietary or market activities in a variety of contexts.23 This distinction 
queries whether the state acts in a governmental or proprietary capacity, with 
divergent legal consequences flowing from that designation. This distinction is 
utilized in diverse legal contexts, ranging from constitutional law to antitrust 
law. 
1. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that “Congress 
shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”24 
Courts have interpreted this positive grant of legislative power to Congress as 
carrying a negative, or dormant, implication that states are prohibited from 
discriminating against or otherwise burdening interstate commerce.25 When the 
state is considered to be acting as a participant in proprietary or market 
activities, however, courts have held such actions immune from dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges.26  
The Supreme Court first laid out this market-participant exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause in the seminal case of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., which involved a Maryland program that imposed stricter 
documentation requirements for out-of-state scrap processors than for in-state 
scrap processors for receiving state subsidies for destroying abandoned 
automobiles.27 The Court upheld the Maryland program because “[n]othing in 
 
 23 Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1075.  
 24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 25 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). For an overview of the dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 47–60 (1988).  
 26 For background on this “market-participant” or “proprietary-activities” exception to the dormant 
Commerce Clause, see Gergen, supra note 16, at 1139–43. 
 27 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The lower court found the Maryland program unconstitutional, citing its 
“substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce.” See Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 
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the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence 
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the 
right to favor its own citizens over others.”28 
After Alexandria Scrap, the Court extended the market-participant 
exception to two other scenarios. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the Court upheld a 
South Dakota policy of limiting sales of cement produced by a state-owned 
plant to state residents in times of cement shortage.29 In White v. 
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the Court rejected a 
Commerce Clause challenge to an executive order of the mayor of Boston 
requiring all city-funded construction projects be performed by a work force at 
least half of which were bona fide city residents.30 In both cases, the Court 
affirmed “[t]he basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as 
market participants and States as market regulators.”31 
In three other cases, however, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the 
market-participant exception. In South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, the Court took up the question of whether the market-participant 
exception would exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny an Alaska 
requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state 
prior to export.32 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that 
“the State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize 
its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it [was] 
not a participant.”33 In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Court again 
declined to apply the market-participant exception.34 In that case, the Court 
struck down an Ohio statute that provided tax credit for ethanol producers from 
Ohio or from states that granted reciprocal tax credit, exemption, or refund for 
Ohio-produced ethanol.35 The Court argued that the market-participant 
exception was inapplicable because “the Ohio action . . . at issue [was] neither 
its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of 
 
F. Supp. 46, 62 (D. Md. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the 
instant case from previous dormant Commerce Clause cases, arguing that Maryland in this case was merely 
acting as “a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce.” Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 
808. 
 28 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810. 
 29 447 U.S. 429 (1980).  
 30 460 U.S. 204 (1983).  
 31 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436; White, 460 U.S. at 207 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436).  
 32 467 U.S. 82 (1984).  
 33 Id. at 99. 
 34 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
 35 Id. at 271, 280. 
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taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”36 Finally, in Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court once again held that 
a preferential state tax exemption did not qualify for immunity under the 
market-participant exception.37  
2. Positive Commerce Clause 
The governmental-proprietary distinction also matters when it comes to the 
positive commerce power. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme 
Court struck down the application of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s minimum 
wages and maximum hours provisions to local and state government “insofar 
as [they] operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”38 According to the 
Court, the exercise of congressional authorities in those areas would impair the 
states’ ability to function effectively in a federal system, and therefore was not 
within the authority granted by the Commerce Clause.39  
A decade later, however, the Court repudiated the governmental-
proprietary distinction it made in National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held that the defendant, a 
municipally owned and operated mass-transit system, was not immune from 
the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, despite that it provided a traditional governmental function.40 In a broad 
ruling, the Court declared that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state 
regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only 
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of 
federalism.”41 Instead, the Court held, “[T]he principal means chosen by the 
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the 
structure of the Federal Government itself.”42  
  
 
 36 Id. at 277. 
 37 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) (“A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market 
that falls within the market-participation doctrine.”). 
 38 426 U.S. 833, 836, 852 (1976).  
 39 Id. at 852. 
 40 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985). 
 41 Id. at 531. 
 42 Id. at 550. The Court implied, however, that a constitutional challenge might remain open if “the 
internal safeguards of the political process have [not] performed as intended.” Id. at 556. 
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3. Antitrust 
The governmental-proprietary distinction also plays a potential role in 
antitrust law under the so-called state-action immunity or exemption. Hailed as 
the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,”43 antitrust law promotes competition and 
consumer welfare through prohibitions of restraints of trade.44 Certain 
restraints of trade, however, are exempted from antitrust liability if they are 
imposed by the state. In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that a raisin 
marketing program approved by producers under the California Agricultural 
Prorate Act did not constitute an illegal restraint of trade within the meaning of 
the Sherman Act since the restraint was imposed by the state “as an act of 
government.”45  
Under the case law, however, a question lingers as to whether the Parker 
state-action immunity extends to the state’s proprietary activities. The seed of 
uncertainty was planted in Parker itself. While recognizing the state’s power to 
impose a restraint of trade “as sovereign,”46 the Court in Parker made it clear 
that it was not dealing with the “question of the state or its municipality 
becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for 
restraint of trade.”47 Later, in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., the Court interpreted this language to mean that the state-action immunity 
“does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity 
but as a commercial participant in a given market.”48 
However, the Court has not explicitly opined on whether the state-action 
immunity recognizes an exception for market or proprietary activities. Most 
 
 43 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 44 See Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. 
L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“Antitrust law is a pro-competition policy. The economic goal of such a policy is to 
promote consumer welfare through the efficient use and allocation of resources, the development of new and 
improved products, and the introduction of new production, distribution, and organizational techniques for 
putting economic resources to beneficial use.”). But see Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate 
Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001) (arguing that the ultimate goal of antitrust law is to promote 
consumer choice); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57 (2013) (arguing that 
antitrust law serves a constitutional function of preventing the assertion of control over the conduct of others 
outside the sphere of one’s own property interests).  
 45 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344, 352 (1943) (“The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate 
program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish 
monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government . . . .”).  
 46 Id. at 352. 
 47 Id. at 351–52.  
 48 499 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1991). The Court later interpreted this statement to be “leaving open the 
possibility of a market participant exception” to state-action immunity. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney 
Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (2013). 
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recently, in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 
the Federal Trade Commission challenged a county hospital authority’s 
acquisition of an existing hospital in the county as anticompetitive.49 The Court 
raised the question of whether there should be a market-participant exception 
to the state-action immunity, but did not answer it.50 Instead, the Court relied 
on an alternative ground in holding that the county hospital authority was not 
eligible for the state-action immunity.51 
B. The Public-Private Distinction 
Besides the governmental-proprietary distinction, courts often utilize a 
public-private distinction when approaching the market-versus-state divide in 
various areas of law. Although the exact form of the public-private distinction 
varies from context to context, the distinction generally inquires whether the 
beneficiary of the disputed action or the individual or entity carrying out the 
disputed action should be classified as public or private. Such distinction leads 
to the application of different legal standards in constitutional law, antitrust, 
and international trade, to name just a few examples.  
1. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The public-private distinction figures prominently in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the dormant Commerce Clause. Over the years, the Court has 
developed a two-tiered analytical framework to determine whether a state 
statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause. When a state statute 
discriminates against interstate commerce, either on its face or in its effect, 
courts apply strict scrutiny and hold the statute virtually per se invalid.52 By 
 
 49 See 568 U.S. at 221–22. The proposed transaction would have allowed the county hospital authority 
to control 86% of the market for acute-care hospital services provided to commercial health care plans and 
their customers. Id.  
 50 The Court did not consider this question in its opinion because “this argument was not raised by the 
parties or passed on by the lower courts.” Id. at 226 n.4.  
 51 The Court applied the “clear-articulation” test under California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), and concluded that the county hospital authority was not eligible 
for state-action immunity because “there is no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital 
authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership.” Id. at 226. 
 52 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding that a surge 
Oregon imposed on in-state disposal of waste generated in other states was facially invalid under the dormant 
Commerce Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey 
statute prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated outside the territorial limits of the 
state violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) 
(holding that a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk unless bottled within five miles from the center of 
the city unduly burdened interstate commerce).  
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contrast, an even-handed state statute with only incidental effects on interstate 
commerce is outlawed only if its burden on interstate commerce is determined 
to clearly exceed its local benefits, under what has become known as the Pike 
balancing test.53  
In a line of cases dealing with local flow-control laws, the Court has 
distinguished between public and private beneficiaries of a disputed state 
action in applying this two-tiered analytical framework. In C & A Carbone, 
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Court invalidated a town’s flow-control 
ordinance requiring all solid waste within the town to be deposited at a 
privately operated transfer station.54 The town guaranteed a minimum waste 
flow to the transfer station as a way of financing the cost of the transfer station, 
which was to be sold to the town in five years for one dollar.55 The Court 
struck down the ordinance as “[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in 
favor of local business or investment.”56 However, in a subsequent case, 
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of several counties’ flow-control 
ordinances requiring businesses hauling waste in the counties to bring waste to 
waste transfer and processing facilities owned and operated by a public benefit 
corporation.57 The Court concluded that the challenged ordinances did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because they “benefit[ed] a clearly 
public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.”58 
According to the Court, laws favoring public entities should be analyzed under 
the more deferential Pike balancing test and the laws at dispute in this case 
passed that test.59  
 
 53 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458, 472 (1981) (holding that a 
Minnesota statute “banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but 
permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk cartons” did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because its incidental burden on interstate commerce was not clearly 
excessive in relation to its putative local benefits); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) 
(holding that an Iowa statute barring the use of trucks longer than sixty feet on Iowa’s interstate highways 
substantially burdened interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause); Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that an Arizona order prohibiting a fruit grower from transporting 
uncrated cantaloupes from its Arizona ranch to a nearby California city for packing and processing constituted 
an unlawful burden on interstate commerce). 
 54 511 U.S. 383 (1994).  
 55 Id. at 387.  
 56 Id. at 392. 
 57 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 58 Id. at 342. 
 59 Id. at 346. The Court upheld the laws because they had no “disparate impact on out-of-state as 
opposed to in-state businesses.” Id. The Court also suggested that the laws in dispute should survive 
Commerce Clause challenges because they carried out a traditional governmental function. Id. at 344 (“We 
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2. Antitrust 
The public-private distinction also plays an important role in the state-
action immunity in antitrust law, where different legal standards apply 
depending on whether the individual or entity carrying out the disputed action 
is classified as public or private.  
In Parker, the Supreme Court declared that “[w]e find nothing in the 
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose 
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its 
legislature.”60 The Court later clarified that the Parker immunity automatically 
applies when the anticompetitive conduct is by the state itself through the state 
legislature or the state supreme court.61  
When a private entity seeks the state-action immunity, however, the Court 
requires the private entity to show that its conduct was pursuant to a “clearly 
articulated” state policy and that it was “actively supervised” by the state in 
carrying out the challenged conduct.62 Applying this two-pronged test, the 
Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 
invalidated a California statute requiring wholesale wine producers to file 
resale price schedules with the state.63 The Court concluded that although the 
California wine pricing system satisfied the “clear articulation” requirement, it 
did not meet the “active state supervision” requirement because “[t]he State 
simply authorize[d] price setting and enforce[d] the prices established by 
private parties.”64 Most recently, in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the Court denied state-action 
immunity to certain anticompetitive conduct by the North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners on grounds that the board was comprised of active market 
participants and carried out the conduct with no active supervision by the 
state.65 
 
should be particularly hesitant to interfere with the Counties’ efforts under the guise of the Commerce Clause 
because ‘[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function.’” (citation omitted)). 
 60 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).  
 61 See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984) (“Thus, under the Court’s rationale in 
Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State, and ipso facto are 
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.” (citation omitted)); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
359–60 (1977) (holding that the state bar of Arizona automatically received Parker immunity because the 
anticompetitive conduct was pursuant to the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court). 
 62 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).  
 63 Id. at 105–06.  
 64 Id. at 105. 
 65 See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116–17 (2015).  
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3. International Trade 
The public-private distinction is also made in international trade law in 
identifying and measuring subsidies. By way of background, Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) authorizes contracting states 
to impose extra tariffs—known as “countervailing duties”—on imports to 
offset certain subsidies conferred upon the imports when the imports cause or 
threaten to cause material injury to the importing country’s domestic 
industries.66 Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (“SCM Agreement”), for a subsidy to be actionable within the WTO 
framework, it must be a “financial contribution by a government or any public 
body.”67 If the entity accused of giving a subsidy is a private body, the 
investigating authority must demonstrate that a government “entrusts or 
directs” the private body to carry out the subsidy-giving activity.68  
The question, however, is whether state-owned entities—either state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) or state-owned commercial banks—should be 
considered public or private bodies for purposes of subsidy identification. The 
policy dilemmas surrounding this question are obvious. On one hand, SOEs or 
state-owned commercial banks may be operated in the same manner as private 
businesses.69 But on the other hand, they may pursue governmental goals, 
making their conduct more akin to that of a government.70 
The classification of SOEs or state-owned commercial banks as public 
bodies has been extensively debated and litigated following the initiation of 
countervailing duty investigations by the United States into imports from 
China.71 The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), the agency responsible 
 
 66 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994].  
 67 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]. The subsidy must also confer a benefit on the recipient and be “specific to an enterprise or 
industry or a group of enterprises or industries.” Id. at arts. 1.1(b), 2.1. 
 68 Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).  
 69 See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 70 “[A] principal justification for the existence of SOEs is to accomplish [governmental objectives, or] 
objectives that, due to market failure, would otherwise be impossible.” See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong 
Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 681 (2015).  
 71 The United States started investigating subsidies conferred on imports from China in 2007, in a 
reversal of its long-standing policy of not imposing countervailing duties on imports from what it considered 
to be “non-market economies.” See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of 
Policy, Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y, Imp. Admin., Countervailing Duty Investigation 
of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China–Whether the Analytical Elements of the 
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for countervailing duty investigations in the United States, initially took a 
formalistic approach, treating all Chinese SOEs and state-owned commercial 
banks as public bodies.72 A WTO dispute settlement panel upheld this 
approach in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, DS379.73 On appeal, the 
WTO Appellate Body74 agreed with the panel’s finding in DS379 as to the 
Chinese state-owned commercial banks,75 but rejected its finding as to the 
Chinese SOEs.76 In another dispute settlement proceeding, DS437, a dispute 
 
Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 2007), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf.  
 72 In Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from People’s Republic of China in 2008, the USDOC 
investigated certain Chinese state-owned steel producers for allegedly providing subsidies to downstream steel 
pipe and tube producers by selling steel products to them for less than adequate remuneration. See 
Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, 
Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of 
China 8–9 (June 13, 2008) [hereinafter China Light-Walled RPT I&D Memo], http://enforcement.trade.gov/ 
frn/summary/prc/E8-14250-1.pdf. The USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which any SOEs 
that were majority owned by the Chinese government were considered public bodies. See id. at 29. In Coated 
Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC similarly treated Chinese state-
owned commercial banks as public bodies, on grounds that the Chinese government maintained near complete 
ownership of the banking sector in China and exercised extensive control and influences over the operations of 
the state-owned commercial banks. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for 
Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Issues and Decision 
Memorandum on the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper 
from the People’s Republic of China 55–61 (Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter China CFS Paper I&D Memo], 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf. 
 73 See Panel Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, ¶¶ 8.138, 8.143, WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379 Panel 
Report]. 
 74 The WTO Appellate Body is “a standing body of seven persons that hears appeals from reports 
issued by panels in disputes brought by WTO Members. . . . [O]nce adopted by the [WTO] Dispute Settlement 
Body, [Appellate Body] reports must be accepted by the parties to the dispute.” See Dispute Settlement: 
Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2017).  
 75 The Appellate Body noted that the USDOC considered “extensive evidence relating to the 
relationship between the [state owned commercial banks] and the Chinese Government, including evidence 
that the [state owned commercial banks] are meaningfully controlled by the government in the exercise of their 
functions.” See Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, ¶ 355, WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter DS379 AB 
Report]. The Appellate Body concluded that “these considerations, taken together, demonstrate that the 
USDOC’s public body determination in respect of [state owned commercial banks] was supported by evidence 
on the record that these [state owned commercial banks] exercise governmental functions on behalf of the 
Chinese Government.” Id. 
 76 The Appellate Body found that the USDOC’s reliance on government ownership was not sufficient 
because “evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by 
government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that the entity is vested with authority 
to perform a governmental function.” Id. at ¶ 346. 
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settlement panel again rejected the practice of treating all Chinese SOEs as 
public bodies. 77 
C. Market Distortion by the State 
Besides the governmental-proprietary distinction and the public-private 
distinction, another market-state interaction that has intrigued the law, 
primarily international trade law, is how the presence of the government in the 
market affects the integrity of the market. Under GATT Article VI, an 
importing country is allowed only to impose countervailing duties not in 
excess of an amount equal to the estimated subsidy.78 The SCM Agreement 
requires that the amount of the subsidy be calculated by comparing the 
treatment the subsidy recipient receives from the government to the treatment 
the subsidy recipient would receive or could have received on the private 
market.79 The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted this requirement to 
embody a market benchmark—a benchmark that identifies and measures a 
subsidy by determining “whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in 
the market.”80  
One question arising from the use of market benchmarks for subsidies is 
what to do with markets that are substantially influenced by the government. In 
United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, the Appellate Body addressed 
whether the United States could reject private stumpage prices in Canada as a 
benchmark for measuring the subsidies Canada allegedly conferred upon 
softwood lumber producers through below-market stumpage rates.81 The 
 
 77 The Panel concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement when it found that Chinese SOEs were public bodies “based solely on the grounds that these 
enterprises were (majority) owned, or otherwise controlled, by the Government of China.” See DS437 Panel 
Report, supra note 13, ¶ 7.75. 
 78 GATT 1994, supra note 66, art. VI:3.  
 79 Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides guidelines on how to calculate the amount of a subsidy in 
four scenarios, involving the government provision of equity capital, government-provided loans, government-
provided loan guarantees, and the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government. SCM 
Agreement, supra note 67, at art. 14. In each of the scenarios, Article 14 requires a comparison between the 
government subsidized outcome and the market outcome. Id. 
 80 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 157, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999). For a discussion of the embrace of market benchmarks under the 
SCM Agreement, see Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of 
Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–18 (2010). 
 81 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 45(b), WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004).  
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Appellate Body held that an investigating authority “may use a benchmark 
other than private prices in the country of provision . . . if it is first established 
that private prices in that country are distorted because of the government’s 
predominant role in providing those goods.”82 After the Appellate Body 
recognized the possibility of using benchmarks other than in-country private 
market prices, the United States rejected private market prices for loans, 
inputs, and lands in China as subsidy benchmarks in several countervailing 
duty investigations involving imports from China, on grounds that such in-
country private market prices were distorted by the Chinese government.83  
China challenged the USDOC’s market-distortion analysis before the 
WTO. In DS379, the Appellate Body sided with the USDOC and upheld its 
market-distortion analysis for Chinese input subsidies.84 The Appellate Body 
reasoned that the Chinese government’s 96.1% market share “makes it likely 
that the government as the predominant supplier has the market power to affect 
through its own pricing strategy the pricing by private providers for the same 
goods, and induce them to align with government prices.”85 The Appellate 
Body also upheld the USDOC’s market-distortion analysis for Chinese loan 
subsidies.86  
 
 82 Id. at ¶ 90. 
 83 In China CFS Paper I&D Memo in 2007, the USDOC refused to use the interest rates for loans made 
by private and foreign banks in China as the benchmark for measuring whether Chinese policy banks and 
state-owned commercial banks provided loans at below-market interest rates, because “[the Chinese 
government]’s intervention in the banking sector creates significant distortions, even restricting and 
influencing private and foreign banks within the PRC.” China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 72, at 5. In 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC rejected 
Chinese domestic steel prices as the benchmark for determining whether Chinese SOEs sold steel inputs to 
downstream producers at below-market prices, because where “the government provides the majority, or a 
substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such goods and services in the country will be 
considered significantly distorted and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether 
there is a benefit.” Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David 
M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China 64 (May 29, 
2008) [hereinafter China CWP I&D Memo] http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf.(final 
determination). Similarly, in Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC 
rejected Chinese domestic land prices as the benchmark for determining whether the Chinese government 
granted land-use rights to Chinese producers at below-market prices, because “Chinese land prices are 
distorted by the significant government role in the market.” Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of 
China 15 (June 16, 2008) [hereinafter China Sacks I&D Memo], http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-
14256-1.pdf (final determination). 
 84 See DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶¶ 448–58.  
 85 Id. at ¶ 455.  
 86 See id. at ¶¶ 471–90. 
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In DS437, however, the Appellate Body reversed itself on Chinese input 
subsidies. According to the Appellate Body in DS437, the USDOC could not 
base its rejection of Chinese domestic prices as the subsidy benchmark merely 
on the fact that government-related entities were the predominant suppliers of 
the relevant goods.87 The Appellate Body suggested that to find market 
distortion, the USDOC needed to explain whether and how government-related 
suppliers “possessed and exerted market power such that other in-country 
prices were distorted” and whether the prices of “government-related 
[suppliers] themselves were market determined.”88 
II. THE EXISTING MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TESTS 
As discussed above, the modern state interacts with the market in myriad 
ways, and the law is often called upon to weigh the legal significances of such 
interactions. However, because market-versus-state interactions take place in 
markedly different contexts, attempts to arrive at a unified theory of how the 
law treats the market-state interaction are all but guaranteed to fail.  
That said, one can glean valuable insights into how the law approaches the 
market-state interaction by examining the analytical methods employed by the 
law in this effort. In this Part, this Article discusses how current law relies on 
four tests, based on ownership, control, function, and role, respectively, to 
evaluate market-versus-state interactions. Many of these tests, however, reflect 
assumptions that have been called into question by changing roles of the state 
and more nuanced understandings of the market-versus-state dynamics. The 
ensuing discussions examine the four tests and their limitations.  
A. Ownership-Based Test 
In drawing the boundary between the market and the state, the law has 
often used the ownership of the entity that carries out the disputed conduct as 
the demarcation line. Under this ownership-based test, the ultimate factor that 
would dictate the legal outcome in a specific case is whether the entity that 
carries out the conduct is publicly or privately owned.  
A subtle form of the ownership-based test is the one used in constitutional 
law in cases dealing with local flow-control statutes. In 2007, the Supreme 
Court in United Haulers held that certain local flow-control ordinances 
 
 87 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from 
China, ¶ 4.95, WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 AB Report]. 
 88 Id. at ¶ 4.96. 
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requiring waste haulers to bring waste to publicly owned transfer and 
processing facilities did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 89 This 
holding stands in stark contrast with the Court’s holding in the earlier case of C 
& A Carbone, in which the Court struck down similar flow-control ordinances 
as per se discrimination against out-of-state waste haulers.90 The only 
difference between United Haulers and C & A Carbone is that the former 
involved waste transfer and processing facilities owned by the government 
while the latter involved privately owned facilities.91 The Court found this 
difference constitutionally significant, holding that “it does not make sense to 
regard laws favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with 
equal skepticism.”92 According to the Court, laws favoring in-state business 
over out-of-state competition are often the product of “simple economic 
protectionism,” while “[l]aws favoring local government . . . may be directed 
toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.”93 The 
legality of the local flow-control ordinances, therefore, entirely hinged upon 
whether the government owned the facilities in question.  
Leaving aside the question of whether discrimination in favor of 
government-owned businesses is more likely than discrimination in favor of 
private businesses to serve legitimate public interest,94 a fatal flaw of the 
ownership-based test is that it is overly formalistic and easily circumventable. 
The facility in C & A Carbone was built by a private contractor for the city 
free of charge, in return for a guaranteed minimum waste flow for five years 
for which it was allowed to charge above-market tipping fees.95 At the end of 
the five-year period, the contractor would sell the facility to the city for a 
nominal amount—one dollar.96 This arrangement was essentially a way of 
financing the cost of constructing the facility, with the private contractor 
 
 89 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. 550 U.S. 330, 345 (2007). 
 90 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–94 (1994). 
 91 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334.  
 92 Id. at 343.  
 93 Id. 
 94 In his dissenting opinion in United Haulers, Justice Alito argued that laws favoring government-
owned businesses were no less discriminatory than laws favoring private businesses, as they “inur[ed] to the 
benefit of local residents who are employed at the facility, local businesses that supply the facility with goods 
and services, and local workers employed by such businesses.” Id. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting). He observed 
that “[e]xperience in other countries, where state ownership is more common than it is in this country, teaches 
that governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned businesses (by shielding them from international 
competition) precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive economic benefits from those 
businesses, including their employees.” Id. “Such discrimination,” according to the Justice, “amounts to 
economic protectionism in any realistic sense of the term.” Id. 
 95 C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387. 
 96 Id.  
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paying the construction cost up front and getting reimbursed by the city 
through guaranteed higher tipping fees.97 The city could simply take out a loan 
and use the loan proceeds to acquire the ownership of the facility from the 
contractor.98 With the facility being a government-owned one, the city would 
be able to bypass the constitutional restriction erected under C & A Carbone. 
The bottom line here is that ownership can be easily purchased and sold. A 
legal test whose outcome depends on something as ephemeral as ownership is 
inherently arbitrary. 
A more overt form of the ownership-based test is often utilized in 
international trade law. This ownership-based test treats state-owned 
enterprises as public bodies, and their mere presence in the marketplace as 
market distorting. In several countervailing duty proceedings involving imports 
from China, the USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which 
any Chinese SOEs that were majority owned by the Chinese government were 
considered public bodies for subsidy determination purposes.99 Similarly, the 
USDOC equated government ownership with market distortion in its subsidy 
benchmark analysis, when it determined that “where . . . the government 
provides the majority, or a substantial portion of the market for a good or 
service, prices for such goods and services in the country will be considered 
significantly distorted and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for 
determining whether there is a benefit.”100 
The problem with this overt form of the ownership-based test is that it goes 
against a principal tenet of the modern views of the government. At least from 
a theoretical perspective, governments could manage SOEs in a hands-off, 
commercially oriented manner, and ensure a level-playing field between SOEs 
and private businesses in the marketplace.101 Indeed, such even-handed 
 
 97 Id. at 393.  
 98 The city would presumably have little difficulty obtaining the loan, as it could use the future revenues 
of the facility, backed by flow-control ordinances, as collateral for the loan.  
 99 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The normal rule followed by the USDOC was to apply a 
five-factor test, which inquires about the government ownership of an entity, the government’s presence on the 
entity’s board of directors, the government’s control over the entity’s activities, the entity’s pursuit of 
governmental policies or interests, and whether the entity is created by statute. See China Light-Walled RPT 
I&D Memo, supra note 72, at 27. The USDOC refused to apply the five-factor test to Chinese SOEs on the 
grounds that the Chinese government failed to provide sufficient information on factors other than the 
government ownership of the SOEs. Id. at 28–30.  
 100 China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 83. 
 101 When the U.S. government took over General Motors at the depth of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, 
it issued guidelines stating that it would manage General Motors “‘in a hands-off, commercial manner’ and not 
get involved in issuing day-to-day directives to GM.” Neil King Jr. et al., Potential Conflicts Abound in 
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treatment of state-owned businesses is considered highly desirable, and is 
promoted as a model for government participation in the economy.102 Equating 
government ownership with governmental conduct essentially denies this 
theoretical possibility and presumes that the government plays a distorting role 
whenever it participates in the economy. 
The ownership-based test has been discredited in international trade law. In 
DS379, the WTO Appellate Body held that “evidence of government 
ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by 
government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that the 
entity is vested with authority to perform a governmental function.”103 The 
Appellate Body also rejected “the application of a per se rule, according to 
which an investigating authority could properly conclude in every case, and 
regardless of any other evidence, that the fact that the government is the 
predominant supplier means that private prices are distorted” for the use of 
out-of-country benchmarks.104 In DS437, the Appellate Body again stated that 
it was inappropriate to infer from the government’s dominant presence in the 
market that the market price is distorted.105  
B. Control-Based Test 
Another market-versus-state test is to equate government control, rather 
than government ownership, with governmental conduct. Under this control-
based test, if the government exercises effective control of an entity, then the 
entity will be deemed a governmental entity and its conduct will be considered 
governmental in nature.  
The control-based test has been used primarily in international trade law. 
Asked to determine the legality of the USDOC’s majority-ownership rule, 
which treated Chinese SOEs as public bodies based on government ownership 
alone,106 the WTO dispute settlement panel in DS379 interpreted the term 
“public body” in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement as “any entity 
 
Government Role, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB124381322189670529.  
 102 See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 20 
(2015) (recommending that “the legal and regulatory framework for SOEs . . . ensure a level playing field and 
fair competition in the marketplace when SOEs undertake economic activities”); OECD, COMPETITIVE 
NEUTRALITY: MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES 29–82 
(2012) (advocating competitive neutrality between SOEs and private businesses).  
 103 DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 346. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 443. 
 105 DS437 AB Report, supra note 87, at ¶ 4.95.  
 106 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
ZHENG GALLEYPROOFS 11/28/2017 12:14 PM 
264 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:243 
controlled by a government.” 107 In defining government control, the panel 
relied on “the everyday financial concept of a ‘controlling interest’ in a 
company.”108 What is needed for governments to exercise a controlling interest 
is “a maximum of 50 per cent plus one share of the voting stock of a company, 
with the possibility that a much smaller voting block can be controlling, 
depending on how dispersed the ownership of the remaining shares is, and the 
extent to which the other shareholders participate in voting.”109 Government 
ownership, according to the panel, is “highly relevant (indeed potentially 
dispositive) evidence of government control.”110 The panel thus found “no 
legal error . . . in giving primacy to evidence of majority government-
ownership.”111 
The WTO Appellate Body, however, rejected the DS379 panel’s singular 
focus on government control. The Appellate Body acknowledged that 
“evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and 
its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant 
entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the 
performance of governmental functions.”112 But, “apart from an express 
delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the existence of mere formal links 
between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to 
establish the necessary possession of governmental authority.”113 The 
Appellate Body finally concluded that “control of an entity by a government, 
in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body.”114 
The Appellate Body’s skepticism of government control is well founded. A 
control-based market-versus-state test suffers from the same fundamental flaw 
as the ownership-based test: it ignores the possibility that a government-
controlled entity may carry out market activities in the same manner as a 
private entity.115 In other words, even if the government has a controlling 
interest in an entity, it may operate the entity in accordance with market 
 
 107 DS379 Panel Report, supra note 73, at ¶ 8.94. 
 108 Id. at ¶ 8.134. 
 109 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at ¶ 8.136. 
 112 DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 318. 
 113 Id. at ¶ 318. 
 114 Id. at ¶ 320. 
 115 Presumably, this possibility underlies the need to differentiate the state’s governmental conduct from 
its market conduct in the first place.  
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principles.116 Equating government control with governmental conduct, like 
equating government ownership with governmental conduct, wrongly 
presumes that all conduct of an entity owned or controlled by the government 
is governmental in nature.  
Another problem with the control-based test is that the concept of 
government control is often elusive, particularly in countries with weak legal 
institutions. When the government does not scrupulously observe the boundary 
between public and private properties, government control extends beyond 
entities in which the government has a controlling interest in the financial 
sense.117 Take China, a country with respect to which the market-versus-state 
issue often comes up, for example.118 In China, the government could exercise 
control over firms in which it holds only a minority ownership interest or even 
no ownership interest at all.119 The picture becomes even more blurred when 
the concept of control is broadened from control in the financial sense to 
control in the residual rights sense, as the Chinese government arguably 
exercises ultimate control over all firms, whether state-owned or privately 
owned, through extra-legal means.120 But on the other side of the coin, 
government control of SOEs in China is diluted because of delegation of 
control to SOE executives and capture of state power by SOEs.121 As a result, 
“firms in China exhibit substantial similarities” in terms of their practical 
relationships with the government, regardless of their formal ownership and 
control structures.122 In light of these realities, a control-based test for 
distinguishing between the market and the state will unduly strain the 
institutional capacity of the authority charged with making that determination.  
C. Function-Based Test 
Yet another test that has been employed to delineate the boundary between 
the market and the state is a function-based test, which considers the state to be 
acting in a governmental capacity if and when the state is performing a 
 
 116 Again, such market-oriented management is actively promoted as a best practice for state-owned 
enterprises. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
 117 See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 70, at 685. 
 118 Note that almost all of the market-versus-state issues in international trade law arise in the context of 
China. See supra Sections I.B–C. 
 119 See MARSHALL W. MEYER & CHANGQI WU, PAULSON INST., MAKING OWNERSHIP MATTER: 
PROSPECTS FOR CHINA’S MIXED OWNERSHIP ECONOMY 9 (2014).  
 120 See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 70, at 685. 
 121 Id. at 676–83.  
 122 Id. at 669. 
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governmental function. As discussed below, this function-based test has 
emerged as a frequently used market-versus-state test in multiple areas of law.  
In constitutional law, jurists have proposed to use the function-based test to 
determine whether states and local government entities should be immune 
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. In Reeves, where the U.S. Supreme 
Court used the market-participant exception to uphold South Dakota’s sale of 
cement produced by a state-owned plant to state residents only,123 Justice 
Powell dissented and rejected the application of the market-participant 
exception in this situation.124 According to Justice Powell, while South Dakota 
entered the private market for cement as a market participant, the dormant 
Commerce Clause still applied because South Dakota’s marketing policy “cut 
off interstate trade”125 and “favor[ed] private, in-state customers over out-of-
state customers.”126 The threshold question, Justice Powell argued, was not 
whether the state entered the private market per se,127 but “the nature of the 
government activity involved.”128 Justice Powell argued for a function-based 
test to determine whether the Commerce Clause is implicated: “If a public 
enterprise undertakes an integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional 
governmental functions, the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant.”129  
Following Justice Powell’s initial backing of the function-based test in 
Reeves, the test gained wider acceptance in subsequent Commerce Clause 
cases. In United Haulers, the Court stated that it was “particularly hesitant” to 
use the Commerce Clause to strike down the waste flow-control laws at 
dispute because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local 
government function.”130 In Davis, the nature of the function performed by the 
government was elevated to be the key factor in disposing of Commerce 
Clause challenges. Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Souter in 
Davis argued that a governmental function is “likely motivate[ed] by 
legitimate objectives distinct from . . . simple economic protectionism” to such 
 
 123 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).  
 124 Id. at 452–53 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 125 Id. at 452. 
 126 Id.at 452–53.  
 127 Justice Powell would distinguish the scenario in which the state enters the private market to supply its 
own needs from the scenario in which the state enters the private market for the advantage of its private 
citizens. In the former scenario, the state may “act without regard to the private marketplace and remove itself 
from the reach of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 450. But in the latter scenario, the state “may not evade the 
constitutional policy against economic Balkanization.” Id. 
 128 Id. at 449.  
 129 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 130 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007) 
(alteration in original).  
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an extent that the standard Commerce Clause does not apply.131 The Court 
upheld Kentucky’s tax scheme favoring in-state municipal bonds because “the 
issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public 
function.”132  
The function-based test has also played a role in deciding whether states 
and local government entities should be made subject to federal antitrust law. 
In Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Abbott Laboratories, the Court 
addressed whether pharmacies owned and operated by a state university and a 
county hospital should be required to defend antitrust claims under the 
Robinson-Patman Act.133 The Court answered the question affirmatively, 
holding that the issue before it was not state purchases “for use in traditional 
governmental functions.”134 Instead, the issue was “limited to state purchases 
for the purpose of competing against private enterprises.”135  
Finally, international trade law has also embraced the function-based test 
as the preferred test for determining whether an entity is a public body for 
subsidy identification purposes. In DS379, after rejecting the control-based test 
for public bodies,136 the WTO Appellate Body held that the assessment of 
whether an entity is a public body “must focus on evidence relevant to the 
question of whether the entity is vested with or exercises government 
authority.”137 The panel in DS437 further interpreted the Appellate Body’s 
holding in DS379 to mean that “the critical consideration in identifying a 
public body is the question of authority to perform governmental functions.”138  
While widely used, the function-based test does not withstand scrutiny. As 
Justice Alito argued in his dissent in United Haulers, “any standard that turns 
on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 
‘integral’ or ‘traditional’ is unsound in principle and unworkable in 
 
 131 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341 (2008). In a footnote, Justice Souter further 
argued that the point of the function-based test was “not to draw fine distinctions among governmental 
functions, but to find out whether the preference was for the benefit of a government fulfilling governmental 
obligations or for the benefit of private interests.” Id. at 341 n.9. This reasoning, however, is rather circular, as 
whether a preference is for the benefit of the government obviously depends on the classification of the 
governmental function in question.  
 132 Id. at 341–42. 
 133 See 460 U.S. 150 (1983).  
 134 Id. at 153–54. 
 135 Id. at 154. The Court held that the defendants’ acts at issue, the retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs, 
was not “‘indisputably’ an attribute of state sovereignty.” Id. at 154 n.6.  
 136 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 137 DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 345. 
 138 DS437 Panel Report, supra note 13, at ¶ 7.66. 
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practice.’’139 Whether a function is a traditional governmental one obviously 
depends on whether it is traditionally performed by the government. But 
traditions evolve over time, rendering the determination of what constitutes 
traditional governmental functions not subject to objective criteria. For 
example, the governmental function at dispute in United Haulers—waste 
disposal—is traditionally performed by local governments, but most of the 
waste produced in the United States today is managed by private businesses.140 
Some other functions, such as social security and health care, were not 
traditionally performed by governments, but became quintessential 
governmental functions as governments expanded their roles over time.141 As a 
federal district court put it, a traditional governmental function is identified “in 
the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when 
they see it, but they can’t describe it.”142  
For these reasons, the Court explicitly abandoned the function-based test in 
Garcia, in which the Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to a municipally owned mass-transit system despite that mass 
transportation was considered a traditional governmental function.143 The 
Court rejected the historical approach to state immunity because “it prevents a 
court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of the States, 
changes that have resulted in a number of once-private functions like education 
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions.”144 The Court further 
rejected nonhistorical standards for selecting immune governmental functions 
such as those seeking to identify “uniquely” or “necessary” governmental 
functions.145 
D. Role-Based Test 
Yet another test that has been used to distinguish between the market and 
the state is to look at the role the government plays in the market-creation 
process. The focus of this test is whether the government created the market in 
question in the first place or merely participates in an existing market. This test 
 
 139 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 368–69 (2007) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).  
 140 Id. at 369. 
 141 Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www. 
ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).  
 142 San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1983).  
 143 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).  
 144 Id. at 543–44. 
 145 Id. at 545. 
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would give the government special treatment in the former, but not the latter, 
scenario.  
In constitutional law, a role-based test has been offered as a basis for 
absolving states of dormant Commerce Clause violations. In his concurring 
opinion in Alexandria Scrap, Justice Stevens argued that Maryland should be 
allowed to subsidize in-state businesses—and in-state businesses only—for 
recycling abandoned automobiles because the market for recycling abandoned 
automobiles was created by the Maryland subsidy program in the first place.146 
According to Justice Stevens, the interstate commerce said to be burdened by 
the Maryland subsidy program—the movement of abandoned automobiles 
from Maryland to out-of-state scrapping plants—“would never have existed if 
in the first instance Maryland had decided to confine its subsidy to operators of 
Maryland plants.”147 The majority in Alexandria Scrap, however, refused to 
adopt Justice Stevens’ reasoning because it found that “the record contain[ed] 
no details of the hulk market prior to the bounty scheme.”148 But the majority 
in Alexandria Scrap was receptive to the idea that if the government was 
indeed the creator of the interstate commerce, it should be able to reduce or 
eliminate the commerce without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.149  
The role-based test in the Commerce Clause context found a strong 
advocate in Professor Laurence Tribe, who attempted to justify the market-
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause on market-creation 
grounds.150 Professor Tribe argued that “[t]he principle that necessarily 
underlies the market participant-market regulator distinction is that, when the 
state is creating commerce that would not otherwise exist, it has greater 
freedom to shape that commerce than when it is intruding into a previously 
existing private market.”151  
A similar role-based test has been adopted in international trade law as 
well. In Canada–Renewable Energy/Canada–Feed-In Tariff Program, Japan 
and the European Union argued that Ontario’s feed-in-tariff (FIT) program, 
 
 146 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815–16 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 147 Id. at 815. The subsidy program Maryland implemented in 1969 initially included subsidies for 
scrapping plants in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Id. 
 148 Id. at 809 n.18 (majority opinion). Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Brennan presented evidence from the 
record that interstate commerce in abandoned automobiles existed prior to the Maryland subsidy program. Id. 
at 824 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 149 Id. at 809 n.18 (majority opinion) (“We would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids 
state action reducing or eliminating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state subsidy instead 
of private market forces.”). 
 150 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 146 (1985).  
 151 Id.  
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which offered to purchase electricity from producers of wind power and solar 
photovoltaic energy at rates above those accorded to producers of conventional 
power, constituted a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.152 
The Appellate Body rejected this argument, holding that it was unable to 
determine whether the FIT program conferred a benefit, an element necessary 
for a finding of a subsidy.153 The Appellate Body held that it could not simply 
compare the rates offered to renewable energy producers to rates prevailing in 
the competitive wholesale electricity market as a whole because the relevant 
markets for the benefit analysis should be the separate competitive markets for 
wind- and solar-generated electricity.154 To hold otherwise, the Appellate Body 
suggested, would mean that the decision by the government to develop 
renewable energy would “in and of itself” be considered as conferring a 
benefit.155 That outcome would have been insensible because, according to the 
Appellate Body, “a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, 
government interventions that create markets that would otherwise not exist 
and, on the other hand, other types of government interventions in support of 
certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct market distortions 
therein.”156 The Appellate Body further explained that “[w]here a government 
creates a market, it cannot be said that the government intervention distorts the 
market, as there would not be a market if the government had not created it.”157  
The logic of the role-based test appears to be that when the government 
creates the market in the first place, it should not be held liable for deviations 
from the normal rules of the marketplace. In constitutional law, the normal rule 
is non-discrimination against out-of-state residents or businesses.158 In 
international trade law, the normal rule is competitive pricing decided by 
market forces.159 But when the government is the creator of the market, it can 
 
 152 See DS412/DS426 AB Report, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 1.6–1.7. 
 153 Id. at ¶ 5.245. The Appellate Body determined that it was unable to complete its analysis because the 
record from the panel proceeding below contained insufficient factual findings and uncontested evidence that 
would allow it to draw a conclusion. See id. 
 154 Id. at ¶ 5.178. 
 155 Id. at ¶ 5.188 (emphasis omitted). If the comparison is between rates offered to renewable energy 
producers and rates in the wholesale electricity market, a benefit will necessarily exist because the former are 
higher than the latter. See Rajib Pal, Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada—Renewable 
Energy/Canada—Feed-in Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
125, 126 (2014). 
 156 DS412/DS426 AB Report, supra note 14, at ¶ 5.188.  
 157 Id. 
 158 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (“[P]rincipal objects of dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce.”). 
 159 This norm is embodied in the use of market benchmarks for identifying and measuring subsidies. See 
supra Section I.C. 
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ignore these normal rules because, as the argument goes, the market would not 
have existed but for the government’s action.160  
The problems with this role-based test are twofold. First, it is not at all 
clear how to ascertain whether the government creates the market in the first 
place. When the government supplies cement to in-state residents to replace 
supply from out-of-state sources, does that constitute the creation of market?161 
Professor Tribe believes so, because “lack of supply blocked purchases of 
cement by state residents [and] the state lessened the obstacle by providing 
additional supply.”162 But the creation of the additional supply creates a market 
only in the sense that the commerce between the source of the additional 
supply and the buyers would not have existed but for the additional supply. 
From the perspective of the pre-existing suppliers, the creation of the 
additional supply only means intrusion into a pre-existing market.163  
The second problem with the role-based test proves more insurmountable. 
Even assuming that it is straightforward to distinguish between creating a new 
market and intruding into a pre-existing market, the role-based test is implicitly 
predicated upon a judgment that the creation of new markets is more valuable 
than adhering to the normal rules of the marketplace.164 The application of the 
role-based test would mean that the government’s creation of new markets—
however it is defined and ascertained—is so worthy that it warrants the 
rejection of any principles at issue, be it nondiscrimination in constitutional 
law or competitive pricing in international trade law. At least in constitutional 
law, this judgment goes against court precedent requiring compliance with the 
nondiscrimination rule even in interstate commerce created by the 
government.165 But even if there is a strong case for the judgment, the case 
needs to be made, not merely assumed. Arguing for the moral superiority of 
 
 160 TRIBE, supra note 150. 
 161 This is the factual set-up in Reeves, where South Dakota restricted the sale of cement produced by a 
state-owned cement plant to in-state residents only. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 162 TRIBE, supra note 150. 
 163 Prior to the construction of the state-owned cement plant, producers outside of South Dakota were 
supplying all the cement used in the state and were making substantial profits. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 
429, 431 n.1 (1980). Professor Dan Coenen argued that while South Dakota satisfied more buyers’ needs at 
lower prices by generating an alternative and additional source of supply, the additional supply displaced out-
of-state sellers in a pre-existing market. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 410–11.  
 164 In a similar fashion, Professor Coenen asked: “Why . . . does the ‘creation’ of ‘commerce’ 
necessarily raise a sufficiently powerful equity to justify state discrimination against interstate commerce?” 
Coenen, supra note 16, at 411.  
 165 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that the State of New York 
was not allowed to deny an out-of-state milk distributor license to purchase milk from within the state for 
supply to Boston).  
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market creation is inherently context-specific; it requires case-by-case analysis 
of the value of market creation in comparison to the value of the competing 
goals. This task could not, by any means, be disposed of through an across-the-
board role-based test.  
III. TOWARD A POWER-BASED MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TEST  
The foregoing analysis outlines four tests, based on ownership, control, 
function, and role, respectively, that have been advanced in different areas of 
law to distinguish between the market and the state. These market-versus-state 
tests, however, suffer serious limitations. They either presume that all conduct 
by the government is governmental in nature, as is the case under the 
ownership-based and control-based tests.166 Or they base legal outcomes on 
factors that do not lend themselves to objective determinations, as is the case 
under the function-based and role-based tests.167 Or they are implicitly 
predicated on a value judgment that needs support on a case-by-case basis, as 
is the case with the role-based test.168 
This Part argues that in the search for a reliable market-versus-state test, 
one defining characteristic of the government has been ignored: the coercive 
power that only the government, as the sovereign, possesses. This Part 
proposes a power-based test that draws the boundary between the market and 
the state based on whether the state is exercising what could be referred to as 
the governmental power, or coercive power to exert control through the 
operation of law with no basis in recognized property rights. This 
governmental power is distinguishable from another coercive power possessed 
by the government, namely, coercive market power by virtue of the 
government’s property rights in economic resources. As detailed below, this 
power-based test avoids the flaws plaguing other market-versus-state tests 
while, above all, capturing the essence of the government. 
This Part first discusses the power-based test and how it differs from the 
approach in current case law. This Part then argues that the power-based test 
should be preceded by an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose of the legal 
regime at issue and whether that purpose implicates the distinction between 
governmental power and market power. This purpose inquiry is crucial as it 
determines whether the power-based test should apply in the first place.  
 
 166 See supra notes 101–02, 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 167 See supra notes 140–42, 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 168 See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
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A. Governmental Power Versus Market Power 
One test that has been ignored by the prevailing market-versus-state 
analysis is to look at the nature of the power that is being exercised by the state 
in a specific state action. Under this test, if the power is a coercive one backed 
by state-sanctioned violence, then the state action will be considered 
governmental in nature. If the state only exercises power stemming from its 
market position, then it will be considered to be acting in a market or 
proprietary capacity.  
As sovereigns, governments exercise coercive power over the people they 
govern.169 This sovereign coercive power, sometimes referred to as regulatory 
power, is the power to exert control through the operation of law with no basis 
in recognized property rights.170 One prominent example of this sovereign 
coercive power is the government’s power to impose taxes.171 The sovereign 
coercive power of the government has animated many legal principles 
designed to keep the government in check.172 In a similar vein, the possession 
and exercise of sovereign coercive power has been considered the hallmark of 
governmental conduct.173  
The government’s sovereign coercive power needs to be differentiated 
from another kind of coercive power the government possesses: coercive 
 
 169 See Town of Graham v. Karpark Corp., 194 F.2d 616, 620–21 (4th Cir. 1952) (“A city has two 
classes of powers, the one legislative or governmental, by virtue of which it controls its people as their 
sovereign, the other proprietary or business, by means of which it acts and contracts for the private advantage 
of the inhabitants of the city and of the city itself.” (quoting Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha, 162 F. 225 
(8th Cir. 1908))). 
 170 Nachbar, supra note 44, at 70–73 (distinguishing between regulatory control and property rights).  
 171 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1194 (1986) (describing taxation as one of the more coercive 
government powers). 
 172 See, e.g., Free v. Miles, 333 F.3d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The limited function of [the 
common law rule that a prisoner is entitled to credit for time served when he is incarcerated through no fault of 
his own] is to prevent the government from abusing its coercive power to imprison a person by artificially 
extending the duration of his sentence through releases and re-incarcerations.”); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 
105 (1st Cir. 1974) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting) (“The safeguards which courts have created around the exercise 
of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination are essentially bulwarks against abuse of the 
government’s coercive power.”); Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v. Clarke, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 
(E.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that the actions of the county sheriff in inviting representatives of a religious 
organization to speak at department leadership conference and roll calls, which police deputies were required 
to attend, was an unconstitutional endorsement of religion through use of coercive power of government). 
 173 In constitutional law, for example, a private actor may be considered to act as an instrument or agent 
of the government for purposes of Fourth and Fifth Amendments if “‘the government exercise[s] such coercive 
power or such significant encouragement that it is responsible’ for the [private actor’s] conduct.” See United 
States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 792 
F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
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power by virtue of the government’s property rights in economic resources. 
For example, when the government refuses to hire contractors whose 
workforce does not include a sufficient percentage of local residents, the 
government is essentially attempting to coerce potential contractors to hire 
local workers up to the set percentage.174 But this coercion is backed not by 
threats of state-sanctioned violence, but by the government’s willingness to 
turn away noncompliant contractors from government projects. To the extent 
that the government projects account for a significant share of the projects 
available on the market, this willingness to say no on the part of the 
government could rise to the level of coercion.175 For the sake of convenience, 
this Article will refer to coercion by virtue of the government’s sovereign 
power as “government coercion” and coercion by virtue of the government’s 
market power as “market coercion.” 
Government coercion and market coercion share a major commonality. 
From the perspective of the parties being coerced, whether the coercion is a 
government one or a market one makes little practical difference. For instance, 
when a contractor is compelled to hire 50% of its employees from local 
residents, the contractor would not care whether it is compelled by a 
government mandate or by the needs to secure government contracts. Professor 
Donald Regan argues that government-spending programs are “less coercive 
than regulatory programs or taxes with similar purposes,” and therefore, “they 
seem to interfere less, or less objectionably, with the ordinary workings of the 
market economy.”176 But in terms of the impact on the parties being coerced, 
the degree of coerciveness is substantially similar between government 
coercion and market coercion.177  
Despite their similarities, what sets government coercion apart from market 
coercion is that the former could only be exercised by the government, while 
the latter could be exercised by both the government and private actors.178 For 
 
 174 This is the factual setup presented in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 
Inc., in which the city of Boston required all city-funded construction projects “be performed by a work force 
consisting of at least half bona fide [city] residents.” 460 U.S. 204, 205–06 (1983). 
 175 Even if the government is just one of many employers on the market, the government’s willingness to 
reject noncompliant contractors is still coercive with respect to the specific government projects in question.  
 176 Regan, supra note 171. Regan put forward this argument as one of the differential treatments of 
spending versus regulation or tax under the dormant Commerce Clause. See id. 
 177 Some may argue that market coercion is not coercion in the true sense because one always has the 
choice of foregoing the market opportunity and thus not being coerced. But as Professor Coenen argues, the 
same can be said of government coercion, as one always has the choice of not doing business in a specific 
jurisdiction. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 415. 
 178 By definition, private actors could only exercise market coercion by virtue of their property rights in 
economic resources, as they are not sovereigns and lack the ability to exercise regulatory power. 
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this reason, this Article refers to the power of government coercion as the 
“governmental power” and the power to exercise market coercion as the 
“market power.” A power-based test takes advantage of this distinction and 
draws the boundary between the market and the state by inquiring about the 
nature of the power being exercised by the government. Under this power-
based test, the government acts in a governmental capacity if and only if it 
exercises the governmental power—power that could not be exercised by 
private actors.  
The power-based test proposed in this Article differs from the approach in 
current case law that distinguishes between the market and the state by 
analogizing the government to private actors. This approach, also known as the 
“private trader analogy”179 or “private-actor analogy,”180 focuses on whether 
the specific state action in question is something that a private actor could or 
would have done. In Reeves, for example, Justice Powell in his dissent 
suggested that in shutting off cement sales to out-of-state customers, South 
Dakota was not really behaving like a private cement producer because it was 
responding to “political concerns that likely would be inconsequential to a 
private cement producer.”181 Similarly, in Wisconsin Department of Industry, 
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
Wisconsin was “not functioning as a private purchaser” of products when it 
prohibited state purchases from repeat labor law violators.182  
The problem with the private-actor analogy is that it requires the 
government to behave exactly like private actors to be considered acting in a 
private capacity.183 But by definition, the government responds to incentives or 
considerations distinct from those facing private actors.184 So the private-actor 
analogy essentially amounts to a per se rule under which a government action 
 
 179 See Treg A. Julander, State Resident Preference Statutes and the Market Participant Exception to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 558 (2002).  
 180 See Stephanie Landry, Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of 
the Market-Participant Doctrine from State Purchase and Sale of Goods and Services to Natural Resources, 
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 515, 523 (1985). 
 181 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 453 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 182 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986) (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 
750 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 183 For the government to be considered to be acting in a private capacity under this private actor 
analogy, the government could not respond to concerns or factors that would not be taken into account by 
private actors. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
 184 As a social planner, the government in conducting its affairs necessarily considers factors that go 
beyond the realms of consideration of the individual members of the society. See JEAN HINDRIKS & GARETH 
D. MYLES, INTERMEDIATE PUBLIC ECONOMICS 425–26 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the difference between the 
social planner’s welfare function and the welfare functions of individual members of the society).  
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is considered governmental in nature simply because it is being conducted by 
the government.185  
By contrast, the power-based test proposed in this Article would focus on 
the nature of the power being exercised by the government in conducting the 
action in question. In Reeves, the power-based test would have treated South 
Dakota’s cement sales as a market action, because South Dakota was 
exercising the power of deciding to whom it will sell its products186—a power 
that every private actor possesses.187 Similarly, in Gould, Wisconsin was 
exercising the power of deciding from whom to source its supplies,188 and the 
power-based test would have treated the state purchases in question as a 
market action despite Wisconsin’s non-market motive in imposing the 
purchase restriction.189  
This distinction between the power-based test and the prevailing private-
actor analogy is crucial. The emphasis of the power-based test is whether a 
private actor possesses the power that is being exercised by the government, 
not whether a private actor would want to exercise that power. A good 
example of this difference can be found in Alexandria Scrap, in which 
Maryland exercised its prerogative as a market participant to bid up the price 
of abandoned automobiles through subsidies, but limited the availability of the 
subsidies to in-state businesses through stricter documentation requirements 
for out-of-state businesses.190 The inquiry under the power-based test would be 
whether a private actor possesses the same kind of power being exercised by 
Maryland—buying products at higher-than-market prices and choosing from 
whom to buy the products. The answer to that question is obviously yes. So 
although a rational private actor would not have wanted to exercise that power, 
the fact that it possesses the power leads to the conclusion that Maryland was 
acting in a proprietary or market capacity.191  
 
 185 This per se rule is not unlike the ownership- and control-based tests, which treat conduct by entities 
owned or controlled by the government as governmental in nature. See supra Sections II.A–B.  
 186 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1980). 
 187 A private actor’s power to choose the party with which to deal is subject to an important limitation 
under antitrust law. When the private actor is a dominant firm, it can exercise the right to refuse to deal with a 
competitor only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
 188 See Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 283–84 (1986). 
 189 See id. at 287. 
 190 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
 191 In Davis, Justice Souter stated that “in Alexandria Scrap, Maryland employed the tools of regulation 
to invigorate its participation in the market for automobile hulks.” Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 
328, 346 (2008). Justice Souter was mistaken in this conclusion, as Maryland was imposing stricter 
documentation requirements for out-of-state businesses in connection with its subsidy spending. The power 
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Besides capturing the fundamental distinction between the market and the 
state, the power-based test overcomes the weaknesses of the other market-
versus-state tests that are based on ownership, control, function, and role. The 
power-based test recognizes that the government could act in a market capacity 
when it is not exercising government coercion.192 The power-based test is not 
susceptible to evolving standards, as it is rooted in the nature of government 
power, which does not change over time.193 And it is not implicitly based on a 
value judgment that needs to be justified.194 In sum, the power-based test 
provides an objective, time-invariant, and value-free way of distinguishing 
between the state’s governmental role and market role.  
B. A Purpose Inquiry 
The power-based test proposed in this Article comes with an important 
caveat. Because the state interacts with the market in numerous settings, not all 
of which implicate the distinction between governmental power and market 
power, the power-based test may not be apposite in all settings where the 
market-versus-state distinction is being made. Therefore, the power-based test 
needs to be preceded by an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose of the legal 
regime at issue and whether that purpose implicates the distinction between 
governmental power and market power. Not only is this purpose-inquiry 
critical to the application of the power-based test, but it also helps reveal the 
meaning and purpose behind the market-versus-state distinction. 
The need for a purpose inquiry can be illustrated using constitutional law 
as an example. Under the market-participant exception to the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the state will be exempted from normal constitutional 
discipline if it is acting in a proprietary capacity.195 But the question is why. 
Answering this question requires an analysis of the fundamental purpose of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. As Professors Michael Wells and Walter 
Hellerstein argue, “[I]f economic Balkanization is the evil that the commerce 
clause was designed to prevent, what difference does it make whether the evil 
 
exercised by Maryland was not regulatory in nature, as a private actor looking to purchase products at higher-
than-market prices also has the power to impose stricter documentation requirements on potential sellers.  
 192 Failure to recognize this possibility is the main problem with the ownership- and control-based tests. 
See supra Sections II.A–B. 
 193 By contrast, the standard for the function-based test is ever-changing depending on the prevailing 
conceptions of the government’s functions. See supra Section II.C. 
 194 Unlike the role-based test, which is based on an implicit value judgment that market creation trumps 
the statutory goals in question, the power-based test does not judge the relative values of the different kinds of 
government power. For discussions of the value dependency of the role-based test, see supra Section II.D. 
 195 See supra section I.A.1. 
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is brought about by states acting in their governmental or proprietary 
capacities?”196 But if the Commerce Clause is intended to address only the ills 
brought about by government coercion through the exercise of the 
government’s regulatory power, then the distinction between the state’s 
governmental and proprietary capacities will become constitutionally 
meaningful.197   
This analytical framework—the power-based test preceded by a purpose 
inquiry—can be applied to any legal regimes that raise market-versus-state 
issues. In antitrust law, for example, the application of this analytical 
framework turns the debate on whether there should be a market-participant 
exception to the state-action immunity into a question about the purpose of the 
state-action immunity. Is the purpose of the immunity to take cognizance of 
federalism concerns arising from the states’ exercise of regulatory power 
only,198 or is it to make federal antitrust law yield to all conduct by states, in 
both governmental and proprietary capacities? The answer to this question is of 
utmost importance to discerning the scope of the state-action immunity.199 
For some legal regimes, the purpose inquiry may lead to the conclusion 
that both governmental power and market power are implicated. As explained 
below, this is the case in international trade law, which restricts governments’ 
ability to confer subsidies in both governmental and proprietary capacities.200 
The market-state distinction, however, may still be relevant to such legal 
regimes if different legal standards apply to the different roles of the 
government. In that case, the power-based test can be used to determine in 
what role the government acts and consequently what legal standard applies. 
IV. APPLYING THE POWER-BASED MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TEST  
The power-based test, coupled with an inquiry as to the purpose of the 
underlying legal regime in relation to state power, yields valuable insights into 
the market-versus-state distinction. As detailed below, this analytical 
framework not only distinguishes the market and the state, but also answers the 
question of why there needs to be a market-versus-state distinction in the first 
 
 196 Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1125. 
 197 For further discussions of the purpose of the Commerce Clause, see infra Section IV.A. 
 198 John F. Hart, “Sovereign” State Policy and State Action Antitrust Immunity, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 
535, 536 (1988). 
 199 For more discussions of the purpose of the state-action immunity in antitrust law, see infra Section 
IV.B. 
 200 See infra Section IV.C. 
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place. The application of the power-based test sheds light on thorny market-
versus-state issues in constitutional law, antitrust law, and international trade 
law.  
A. Constitutional Law 
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence on a state-versus-market distinction 
for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, scholars have questioned the validity 
of such distinction. Professors Wells and Hellerstein, for example, argue that 
the state-versus-market distinction has no legitimate place in dormant 
Commerce Clause inquiries because the state’s market activities result in the 
same economic Balkanization as do the state’s governmental activities.201 
Other scholars also reject prevailing justifications for the market-participant 
exception on numerous policy grounds.202 
Under the power-based test, it becomes clear that different 
conceptualizations of the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause motivate 
the different approaches to the market-participant exception to the clause. In 
Alexandria Scrap, the district court adopted an expansive interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, based on the premise that “this Nation is a common market 
in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw 
materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and 
demand.”203 Under this interpretation, any state actions that inhibit the national 
common market are within the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
regardless of whether the states inhibit the national common market through 
governmental power or market power.204 Rejecting the district court’s 
reasoning, the Supreme Court in Alexandria Scrap narrowed the reach of the 
dormant Commerce Clause to include only state interference with “the natural 
functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through 
burdensome regulation.”205 In other words, according to the Court, only when 
the states are exercising government coercion will the dormant Commerce 
Clause be implicated. Based on this narrower interpretation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Court in Alexandria Scrap went on to recognize a 
 
 201 See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1125–26.  
 202 See, e.g., Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 559, 582–601 (1990); Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
487, 505–07 (1981).  
 203 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976).  
 204 Id. at 805 (“This line of reasoning is not without force if its basic premise is accepted. That premise is 
that every action by a State that has the effect of reducing in some manner the flow of goods in interstate 
commerce is potentially an impermissible burden.”). 
 205 Id. at 806. 
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market-participant exception. Similarly, in Reeves, the Court stated that “the 
Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures 
impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. There is no indication 
of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate 
freely in the free market.”206  
If the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to only reign in 
governmental power, then whether the state exercises that power in the specific 
action at issue becomes the ultimate factor in determining whether the dormant 
Commerce Clause applies. In other words, when the state exercises market 
power and market power only, it acts in a proprietary capacity and will be out 
of the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
This insight would inject much-needed logic into the case law on the 
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. In Alexandria 
Scrap, Maryland was exercising the power of spending money to subsidize the 
recycling of abandoned automobiles.207 Although Maryland imposed a 
documentation requirement on the subsidy recipients, that requirement was a 
condition for receiving the subsidies, something in which the state had 
property rights.208 So at most Maryland was exercising market power, a power 
that private actors possess.209 In Reeves, South Dakota was exercising the 
power of choosing to whom to sell its products, a quintessential private 
power.210 Similarly, in White, the City of Boston was exercising market power, 
not governmental power, when it required contractors to hire at least 50% of 
their labor force from local residents before they were allowed to work on city-
funded projects.211 The Court correctly held, therefore, that the government in 
all these cases qualified for the market-participant exception. 
The power-based test does indicate that the Court was wrong in not 
applying the market-participant exception in Wunnicke, where Alaska required 
that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state prior to 
export.212 The Court declined to apply the market-participant exception to the 
 
 206 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1980) (internal citation omitted). 
 207 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 797. 
 208 Id. at 798.  
 209 Although a private actor would not want to give out money for free to encourage the recycling of 
abandoned automobiles, it does have the power to do so and to impose documentation requirements as a 
condition.  
 210 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 432–33. 
 211 See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). The City of Boston would 
have exercised the power of government coercion had it required all businesses, not just businesses working on 
city-funded projects, to hire at least 50% of their labor force from local residents. 
 212 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984).  
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Alaska requirement because it was a downstream restriction with regulatory 
effects.213 The Court stated that “[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine 
must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the 
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.”214 Viewed in 
light of the power-based test, this characterization of the market-participant 
exception is both overly broad and overly narrow. It is overly broad because 
the market-participant exception does not always allow a state to impose 
burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant—it only 
allows a state to impose burdens that could be imposed by private actors.215 It 
is overly narrow because when a state exercises market power only, it is 
accorded the market-participant status even if the restriction extends beyond 
the immediate market in which the state is a participant. This was the case in 
White, in which the Court upheld the City of Boston’s labor force requirement 
for government contractors despite the fact that the city itself was not a 
participant in the labor market at issue.216  
The power-based test would point to a different outcome in Wunnicke, 
because Alaska in that case was merely imposing a restriction on the 
processing of timber taken from state-owned lands in which Alaska had 
property rights. 217 In so doing, Alaska was exercising a power possessed by 
private actors, who could impose similar processing requirements for timber 
taken from their own lands. The power-based test, therefore, would exempt the 
Alaska requirement from scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The power-based test would also help solve another puzzle in the dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Under current case law, while the Court 
draws a distinction between impermissible market regulation and permissible 
market participation,218 it has not delineated a clear boundary between the two. 
For instance, the Court treats tax credits and exemptions as market regulation 
 
 213 Id. at 99. 
 214 Id. at 97. 
 215 In United Haulers, for example, the government imposed restrictions with regulatory effects in the 
market in which it was a participant—the waste transfer and processing market. See United Haulers Ass’n v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).  
 216 White, 460 U.S. at 205–06. The city was a participant in the market for construction projects, not in 
the labor market for workers who would work on those projects.  
 217 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 84. 
 218 See, e.g., id. at 93 (plurality opinion) (“Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market 
participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its 
activities.”). 
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on the grounds that taxation is inherently governmental.219 But it fails to 
explain why subsidies, which it upholds as market participation under the 
market-participant rule,220 are any less governmental than taxation.221 
Commentators offered several justifications for the more relaxed treatment of 
subsidies under the dormant Commerce Clause on the basis of policy and 
history.222 One difference noted by commentators between taxation and 
subsidies is that the latter is relatively expensive, making it less likely to cause 
serious damage to the economy.223 Another frequently made argument is that 
the “conscious funding” required of subsidies operates as a check against their 
proliferation.224 Commentators also resorted to formalism and tradition as 
explanations.225 But however convincing these justifications might be,226 they 
have no bearings on the question of why the state is a market regulator with 
respect to taxation, but a market participant with respect to subsidies.227  
The power-based test provides a straightforward justification for the 
differential treatment of taxation and subsidies under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. In Limbach, the Court held that Ohio was not acting as a market 
participant when it provided tax credit to ethanol producers from Ohio or from 
 
 219 See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (“The market-participant 
doctrine has no application here. The Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of 
ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”).  
 220 Recall that Alexandria Scrap involved a state subsidy program. See supra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
 221 Government spending on economic and social programs accounts for a large percentage of the 
government’s activities. The U.S. federal government, for example, spends almost half of its budget on the so-
called entitlement programs, including Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare. See ROMINA BOCCIA, 
HERITAGE FOUND., FEDERAL SPENDING BY THE NUMBERS, 2014: GOVERNMENT SPENDING TRENDS IN 
GRAPHICS, TABLES, AND KEY POINTS (INCLUDING 51 EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT WASTE) (2014). One 
economist has referred to government spending in the form of subsidies one of the “three major sets of 
measures” by which the government “alter[s] the distribution of income.” MILTON H. SPENCER, 
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 72 (2d ed. 1974).  
 222 See Coenen, supra note 16, at 479–81; Collins, supra note 25, at 98–103; Enrich, supra note 16, at 
442–43; Gergen, supra note 16, at 1134–53; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 846–48; Paul S. Kline, 
Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the Market Participant Doctrine, 96 DICK. L. 
REV. 331, 370–91 (1992); Regan, supra note 171, at 1193–95. 
 223 See Regan, supra note 171; see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 846–47. 
 224 Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 585 (1983); see 
also Coenen, supra note 16, at 479; Collins, supra note 25, at 102–03; Enrich, supra note 16, at 442–43; Kline, 
supra note 222, at 374.  
 225 See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 
980–81 (1998); Coenen, supra note 16, at 480; Gergen, supra note 16, at 1136–37.  
 226 Commentators have questioned some of those justifications. For instance, Coenen argues that it is 
debatable whether subsidy programs are inherently more expensive than discriminatory state regulatory and 
tax programs. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 434.  
 227 These justifications either do not address the market-participation question at all, or just circle back to 
the argument that taxation is inherently governmental. See Enrich, supra note 16, at 442.  
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states that granted reciprocal tax credit, exemption, or refund for Ohio-
produced ethanol.228 The Court reasoned that the state action at issue was the 
“assessment and computation of taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”229 
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court held that 
Maine was not engaging in a proprietary activity when it provided property tax 
exemptions only to charities that catered principally to state residents, on 
grounds that “[a] tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in 
the market that falls within the market-participation doctrine.”230 In neither 
case, however, did the Court specify why state actions involving taxation are 
inherently governmental. The power-based test supplies the missing rationale. 
Taxation is inherently governmental because it entails the exercise of 
governmental power, a power that no private actors possess. Seen in this light, 
state actions involving taxation are governmental in nature and should not be 
eligible for the market-participant exception.231  
By contrast, when the state gives subsidies, it exercises a power that every 
private actor possesses: giving out money for free without receiving things of 
 
 228 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 277 (1988).  
 229 Id. at 277. 
 230 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997).  
 231 There is a potential fault line in the Court’s treatment of taxation cases. While the Court in Limbach 
and Camps Newfound/Owatonna struck down the discriminatory tax credit or exemption at issue as violations 
of the dormant Commerce Clause, it upheld, in Davis, a Kentucky tax scheme in which the state exempted 
interest income on state municipal bonds, but not interest income on out-of-state municipal bonds, from state 
income taxes. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 333–34, 341–42 (2008). The nature of the 
power exercised by the government in Davis, however, was arguably indistinguishable from the nature of 
power exercised by the government in Limbach and Camps Newfound/Owatonna. So although Kentucky could 
be said to be participating in the market for municipal bonds by making in-state municipal bonds more 
attractive, the fact that it was exercising the power of government coercion makes it clear that it was acting in a 
governmental capacity. The power-based test, therefore, would squarely place the state action in Davis subject 
to the dormant Commerce Clause.  
To the extent that Davis needs to be distinguished from Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna, 
such distinctions need to come from elsewhere. One likely basis on which Davis could be distinguished from 
Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna is that in Davis, the ultimate beneficiary of the state action was the 
state itself, while in Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna, the ultimate beneficiaries of the state actions 
were individuals or entities other than the state. In Davis, the ultimate beneficiary of the state action was the 
state itself because the discriminatory tax exemption made it easier for the political subdivisions of the state to 
issue bonds. In Limbach, the ultimate beneficiaries of the state action were all those who would benefit from 
the local production of ethanol—farmers, distributors, and suppliers, etc. In Camp Newfounds/Owatonna, the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the state action were all residents who would stand to benefit from the services 
provided by the charities eligible for the tax exemption. It could be argued that when the ultimate beneficiary 
of the state action is the state itself, it does not raise the same level of concerns about discrimination as when 
the ultimate beneficiary of the state action is someone other than the state. Note that this distinction is not 
based on the government ownership or control of the ultimate beneficiary of the state action and thus can avoid 
the problems associated with the ownership- and control-based tests. For discussions of the ownership- and 
control-based tests, see supra Sections II.A–B. 
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equal value in return.232 The only case in which the Court struck down a state 
subsidy program was West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, in which 
Massachusetts imposed a tax on fluid milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts 
retailers and distributed the assessment to Massachusetts dairy farmers.233 The 
Court held that the Massachusetts program unconstitutionally discriminated 
against interstate commerce even though the two components of the 
program—the subsidy component and the tax component—would be valid 
separately.234 It was the coupling of a subsidy with a simultaneously enacted 
tax, according to the Court, that raised constitutional difficulties.235 Viewed 
against the backdrop of the power-based test, the Court’s objection to an 
otherwise legal subsidy scheme in West Lynn makes perfect sense, as the state 
was exercising governmental power as well as market power. It was the 
coupling of the two powers that sets West Lynn apart from other subsidy 
cases.236 
The power-based test also elucidates another line of cases involving local 
flow-control ordinances. In C & A Carbone and United Haulers, the Court was 
confronted with the question of whether flow-control ordinances requiring 
waste haulers to bring waste to designated waste transfer and processing 
facilities violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court answered yes in C 
& A Carbone but no in United Haulers, with the only difference between the 
two cases being that the designated facility was privately owned in the former 
case but publicly owned in the latter.237 It is abundantly clear, however, that 
the government was exercising governmental power in both cases, as the 
government was mandating the disposal of waste in which it had no property 
rights.238 And as previously discussed, the government ownership of the waste 
 
 232 A private business, for example, could decide to subsidize a particular group of customers using 
revenues collected from other customers. Turbotax, the popular tax software, charges $0 for customers who 
file the most basic tax returns but $54.99–$114.99 for customers who file more complicated returns. See 
Compare Turbotax Online Products, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/compare/online/ 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2017).  
 233 512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).  
 234 Id. at 198–202.  
 235 Id. at 200–01.  
 236 The coupling of governmental and market power of spending money takes West Lynn out of the 
realm of the market-participant exception. The Court in West Lynn could have brought more consistency to the 
case law by explicitly noting that the market-participant exception did not apply, rather than being silent about 
the market-participant exception at all. For discussions of the Court’s inconsistency in using the market-
participant exception as the framework for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause issues, see supra Section 
II.A.1. 
 237 For discussions of C & A Carbone and United Haulers, see supra Section II.A.1. 
 238 In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, Justice Souter suggested that United Haulers “may 
also be seen under the broader rubric of the market participant doctrine.” 553 U.S. 328, 343 (2008) (plurality 
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transfer and processing facilities at issue in C & A Carbone and United 
Haulers was a rather fictitious way of distinguishing the two cases.239 The 
power-based test, therefore, would demand equal treatment of the flow-control 
ordinances in those two cases. 
B. Antitrust Law 
In antitrust law, complex market-versus-state issues revolve not so much 
around how to draw the market-versus-state distinction as around whether the 
market-versus-state distinction is relevant at all. In cases involving the state-
action immunity doctrine, it is relatively clear whether the state was acting in a 
regulatory capacity or a proprietary capacity. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire, for example, the action being challenged was the defendant city’s 
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services and its attempt to tie 
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services.240 In Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney 
Health System, Inc., for another example, the action being challenged was the 
defendant hospital authority’s acquisition of another hospital.241 In both cases, 
the defendants were engaged in market activities that were otherwise 
indistinguishable from conduct by private businesses. By contrast, in North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the 
action being challenged was the issuing of cease-and-desist letters by the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners to non-dentist teeth whitening 
service providers.242 It is obvious that in issuing the letters, the board was 
exercising governmental power, as no private actors possess the power to force 
 
opinion). According to Justice Souter, the fact that the state simultaneously exercises regulatory power while 
participating in market activities does not make the market-participant rule inapposite; the dispositive factor is 
the government’s market activities. Id. at 346 (“Not only did the public authority acting in [United Haulers] 
process trash, but its governmental superiors forbade trash haulers to deal with any other processors. This latter 
fact did not determine the outcome, however; the dispositive fact was the government’s own activity in 
processing trash.”). Justice Souter would have upheld the flow-control ordinances at issue in United Haulers 
under the market-participant exception because the counties in that case participated in the market for trash 
processing. Id. at 346–47 (“We upheld the government’s decision to shut down the old market for trash 
processing only because it created a new one all by itself, and thereby became a participant in a market with 
just one supplier of a necessary service.”). Justice Souter also characterized two other market-participant cases, 
Alexandria Scrap and White, as examples of the government’s commercial activities being joined by its 
regulatory efforts. Id. at 345–46. But obviously, Justice Souter’s expansive view of the market-participant 
exception was not shared by the rest of the majority.  
 239 See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 240 471 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1985). 
 241 568 U.S. 216, 222 (2013).  
 242 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2015).  
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other private actors to stop providing services that they are legally entitled to 
provide.243 
While it is relatively straightforward to distinguish between the market and 
the state in the antitrust context, the market-versus-state distinction has not 
really mattered much under current case law. Under the state-action immunity 
doctrine, what matters is whether the action at issue reflects the state’s policy, 
regardless of the capacity in which the state carries out the action.244 So even if 
the state acts in a proprietary capacity, as in Phoebe Putney, as long as the 
action is clearly articulated by state policy and actively supervised by the state, 
it would be eligible for the state-action immunity.245  
But had there been a market-participant exception to the state-action 
immunity, it would have mattered whether the state acts in a governmental or 
proprietary capacity. Under such an exception, when the state acts in a 
proprietary capacity, the state will be subject to antitrust scrutiny regardless of 
whether it authorizes the action. In Phoebe Putney, an amicus curiae argued 
that the Court should recognize such an exception, although its argument was 
based, erroneously, on the notion that the state’s commercial activities are not 
a traditional government function.246 The Court, however, declined to take up 
this question, because it “was not raised by the parties or passed on by the 
lower courts.”247  
Should there be a market-participant exception to the state-action immunity 
in antitrust law? While the Court has not explicitly endorsed a market-
participant exception, its holding in Abbott Laboratories provides some 
support for such an exception.248 In that case, plaintiff pharmacies sued 
defendant state university and county hospital pharmacies for inducing 
 
 243 Whether the board was exercising the power of government coercion is a question separate from 
whether the board was a governmental body. Even if the board was a private body, that distinction does not 
prevent the conclusion that it was exercising governmental power.  
 244 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 245 In Phoebe Putney, the Court denied state-action immunity to the defendant on the basis that there was 
not a sufficient articulation of state policy to authorize the anticompetitive conduct. 568 U.S. at 228.  
 246 See Brief for National Federation of Independent Business as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Petitioner at 6–24, Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. 216 (No. 11-1160). The amicus curiae argued that applying state-
action immunity to the state’s commercial conduct would exceed the state-action immunity doctrine’s purpose 
because “[m]arket-participant state conduct is not an ‘integral operation in an area of traditional government 
functions.’” Id. at 15 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 424 (1978) (Burger, 
C.J., concurring)). This argument resembles the function-based test that distinguishes between the regulatory 
and market roles of the state based on whether the function at issue is a traditional government function. See 
supra Section II.C. 
 247 See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 226 n.4.  
 248 Jefferson Cty. Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983).  
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pharmaceutical manufacturers to sell their products to the defendants at prices 
lower than those charged to the plaintiffs in violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.249 The defendants sought to dismiss the case “on the ground that state 
purchases are exempt [from the Robinson-Patman Act] as a matter of law.”250 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that “the exemption does not apply 
where a State has chosen to compete in the private retail market.”251 The Court 
observed that “[o]n numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent ‘a carefully studied attempt to bring within [them] every person 
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial 
intercourse among the states.’”252 It is unclear, however, whether this sweeping 
statement implies a general market-participant exception to state-action 
immunity, given that the Court in this case predicated its holding on its 
analysis of the text and legislative history of the specific statute at dispute, the 
Robinson-Patman Act.253 
In another case, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the 
Court also sent mixed signals on the market-participant exception to the state-
action immunity.254 In that case, the Court addressed whether defendant cities 
that owned and operated electric utility systems should be allowed to dismiss 
antitrust counterclaims filed against them simply by reason of their status as 
state agencies or subdivisions of a state.255 On one hand, the Court rejected 
defendants’ argument that “the antitrust laws are intended to protect the public 
only from abuses of private power and not from actions of municipalities that 
exist to serve the public weal.”256 Instead, the Court stated that “the economic 
 
 249 Id. at 151–52. The Robinson-Patman Act provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between 
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may 
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, 
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .” Id. at 152 n.1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982)). 
 250 Id. at 153. 
 251 Id. at 154.  
 252 Id. at 157. The Court held that the term “person” used in the Robinson-Patman Act is sufficiently 
broad to cover governmental bodies. Id. at 155. 
 253 The Court concluded that “the plain language of the [Robinson-Patman] Act strongly suggests that 
there is no exemption for state purchases to compete with private enterprise.” Id. at 156–57. The Court then 
found that “[t]he legislative history [of the Robinson-Patman Act] falls far short of supporting respondents’ 
contention that there is an exemption for state purchases of ‘commodities’ for ‘resale.’” Id. at 159. 
 254 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
 255 Id. at 392. The counterclaims alleged that, among other things, one of the defendant cities contracted 
to provide gas and water service to the plaintiff’s electric customers only on the condition that the customers 
purchase electricity from the city. Id. at 403–04. 
 256 Id. at 403.  
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choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their business affairs . . . 
are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader interests of national 
economic well-being than are those of private corporations.”257 But on the 
other hand, the Court went on to hold that “the fact that municipalities, simply 
by their status as such, are not within the Parker doctrine, does not necessarily 
mean that all of their anticompetitive activities are subject to antitrust 
restraints.”258 According to the Court, municipalities are still eligible for 
immunity from antitrust laws if their activities are directed by the state.259 
Therefore, despite its assertion of the broad coverage of antitrust laws, the 
Court in City of Lafayette indeed implied that antitrust laws did not apply to 
the state’s actions as a market participant.260 
The power-based market-versus-state test would bring clarity to the debate 
on whether there should be a market-participant exception to the state-action 
immunity. Under the power-based test, whether a state’s proprietary activities 
should be outside of the purview of a specific legal regime depends on whether 
the legal regime is implicated only when the state exercises governmental 
power. In the context of the state-action immunity, this inquiry questions the 
fundamental purpose of this immunity.  
It is a near consensus that the state-action immunity is based on the concept 
of federalism.261 Federalism promotes “citizen participation in government, 
efficiency in government, creative experimentation, and diffusion of power.”262 
The Court’s willingness to defer to “a dual system of government in which . . . 
the states are sovereign” forms the basis of the state-action immunity.263 But 
the question is whether federalism concerns arise to the same degree when a 
state is exercising governmental power and when it is exercising market 
 
 257 Id.  
 258 Id. at 413. 
 259 Id. at 416. The Court agreed with the lower court that further inquiries should be made to determine 
whether the defendants’ actions were directed by the state. See id. at 413–15. 
 260 Recall that the defendant cities’ actions at issue in City of Lafayette were commercial in nature. See 
supra note 255 and accompanying text.  
 261 See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1203, 1250–71 (1997) (examining the antitrust state-action doctrine from the perspective of federalism); 
Jorde, supra note 16, at 230 (arguing that the Parker Court grounded the state action doctrine and its own 
judicial restraint on the structure of economic federalism); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the 
Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 
B.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1105 (1981) (“[T]he Parker Court did not base its construction of the Sherman Act on 
legislative history, but instead derived a presumption of congressional intent from the concept of federalism.”).  
 262 Jorde, supra note 16, at 230–31.  
 263 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
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power. In other words, the question is whether the nature of the power being 
exercised by the state is relevant to the value of federalism.  
While this question has no easy answers, the weight of the arguments tilts 
in favor of no market-participant exception to the state-action immunity. It 
could certainly be argued that when a state exercises market power, its 
prerogatives as a sovereign are not compromised by the application of federal 
antitrust law to the same degree as when it exercises governmental power. But 
no matter whether a state exercises governmental or market power, deference 
to state actions serves the same goals of federalism, namely promoting citizen 
participation, efficiency in government, creative experimentation, and 
diffusion of power.264 Furthermore, as Professor Coenen argued, restrictions on 
the state’s exercise of market activities are a greater intrusion into state 
sovereignty than are restrictions on the state’s regulatory activities, as “state 
resources are the state’s ‘own’ in a way that the state’s regulatory powers are 
not.”265 The power-based test, therefore, would support shielding states’ 
market or proprietary activities from federal antitrust law.  
C. International Trade Law 
Applying the power-based test to international trade law reveals that 
international trade law regulates both governmental power and market power. 
As discussed below, this conclusion is dictated by the purpose of international 
trade law in general and international subsidy law in particular. 
A core principle of international trade law is the “liberal economic 
doctrine,” which recognizes the benefits of free trade to all countries 
participating in international trade.266 Consistent with this principle, the 
primary purpose of the GATT and the WTO is to dismantle barriers to trade.267 
As a general matter, international trade law seeks to reduce or eliminate trade 
barriers that arise from both the regulatory and market conduct of the states. A 
typical trade barrier erected by the states in their regulatory capacities is 
 
 264 For instance, it could be argued that when citizens of a state authorize an SOE to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct, they are participating in government to the same degree as when they impose 
coercive requirements. It could also be argued that they are addressing the special needs of the local 
population, thereby promoting government efficiency. And such participation equally promotes policy 
experimentation and diffusion of power.  
 265 See Coenen, supra note 16, at 427.  
 266 Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 781 (1997). 
 267 Id. at 780; see also JAN HOOGMARTENS, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE 
WTO 10 (2004). 
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tariffs,268 which the GATT and the WTO have successfully reduced over the 
years.269 International trade law also imposes disciplines on the states when 
they undertake market activities through “state trading enterprises.”270 The 
states are required, among other things, to operate such enterprises in 
accordance with commercial considerations.271 These disciplines on the states’ 
market activities are based on the understanding that the states may operate 
such businesses “so as to create serious obstacles to trade.”272 
That international trade law is concerned about the states’ market conduct 
can also be seen in the very existence of international subsidy law. As 
previously discussed, the conferral of subsidies generally involves no 
governmental power; any private actors could give out money without 
receiving a quid pro quo.273 In legal regimes that are intended to only curb the 
state’s exercise of governmental power—the dormant Commerce Clause under 
constitutional law, for example274—the granting of subsidies by the states 
poses no threats to the goal of the legal regimes. That explains why state 
actions involving subsidies are generally exempted from scrutiny in such legal 
regimes.275 The fact that strict subsidy rules exist under international trade law 
indicates a fundamental difference between the purpose of international trade 
law and that of constitutional law.  
Although international trade law implicates both governmental power and 
market power, it still makes a distinction between the market and the state. In 
international subsidy law, an important question is when an entity owned or 
 
 268 Tariffs are akin to taxes in that their imposition requires the power of government coercion, as no 
private actors possess the power to collect money without providing goods or services of equivalent values.  
 269 Average tariffs in industrial countries plummeted from 40% in 1947, when the GATT entered into 
force, to 6.3% in 1994 just prior to the entry into force of the Uruguay Round agreements, and further to 3.9% 
as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements that led to the establishment of the WTO. See Raj Bhala, 
Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1995).  
 270 GATT 1994, supra note 66, at art. XVII. 
 271 Article XVII of GATT 1994 requires: “[S]uch enterprises shall, having due regard to the other 
provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in 
accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales.” Id. at 
art. XVII:1(b). 
 272 Id. at art. XVII:3.  
 273 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 274 For a discussion of the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, see supra Section IV.A. 
 275 The only exception is when the granting of subsidies involves the power of government coercion, in 
which case the subsidy-granting action will be made subject to the discipline of the state’s regulatory actions. 
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).  
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controlled by the state is a “public body.”276 This question matters because the 
legal rules for identifying a countervailable subsidy differ depending on 
whether the entity in question is a public or private body.277 As discussed 
above, the WTO experimented with ownership-based and control-based 
definitions of public bodies before settling on a function-based definition.278 
According to the WTO dispute settlement panel in DS437, “the critical 
consideration in identifying a public body is the question of authority to 
perform governmental functions.”279 This definition, however, begs the 
question of what constitutes a governmental function.280 The logic of the 
power-based test points to a straightforward answer to this question. Under the 
power-based test, a public body should be defined as an entity that possesses 
and exercises governmental power. So when an SOE is allegedly providing a 
subsidy, whether the SOE should be deemed a public body will depend on 
whether the SOE is equipped with coercive power with no basis in recognized 
property rights.281 This power-based definition would avoid the problems 
associated with other definitions based on ownership, control, function, or role.  
CONCLUSION 
What is the boundary between the market and the state? The prevailing 
approaches focus on the government’s ownership, control, function, or role to 
answer this question. This Article challenges these approaches and proposes an 
alternative market-versus-state test that focuses on the nature of the power 
being exercised in the challenged action. This power-based test captures the 
essence of governmental conduct and, when coupled with inquiries as to the 
fundamental purpose of the legal regime at issue, sheds light on the more 
important question of why the market-versus-state distinction matters at all. 
The insights from the power-based test lay the foundation for a coherent 
methodology for tackling complex legal issues surrounding the market-versus-
state distinction.  
 
 
 276 For a background discussion on the “public body” issue, see supra Section I.B.3. 
 277 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 278 See supra Sections II.A–C. 
 279 DS437 Panel Report, supra note 13, at ¶ 7.66. 
 280 For more discussion of the problems with the function-based definition of public bodies, see supra 
Section II.C. 
 281 In DS437, China argued that “[a] public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus must itself 
possess the authority to ‘regulate, control, supervise or restrain’ the conduct of others.” DS437 Panel Report, 
supra note 13, at ¶ 7.67 (alteration in original). The panel, however, rejected this argument on textual grounds. 
Id. at ¶ 7.68. 
